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FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

NAVMC 2915, COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN, establishes a baseline for Marine Corps support of National level counterdrug supply and demand reduction efforts. The Plan formalizes the implementation of current Marine Corps policy and codifies responsibilities for policy implementation; and finally provides a blueprint for future support.

2. FREQUENCY

This Manual will be revised biannually.

3. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Manual is effective 1 December 1993.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for improving this Manual are invited and should be submitted in writing to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (POS).

5. RESERVE APPLICABILITY

This Manual is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

6. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.


W. E. BOOMER

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps

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COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

0001.	Purpose.....	V
0002.	Background.....	V
0003.	Assumptions.....	viii

CHAPTER 1

THE NARCOTICS THREAT

1001.	Foreign Supply.....	1-1
	The Latin American Connection.....	1-1
	Trafficking Routes.....	1-1
	Southeast Asia and the Middle East.....	1-2
	National Security Problems.....	1-2
1002.	Domestic Demand.....	1-3

CHAPTER 2

POLICY

2001.	Department of Defense (DoD).....	2-1
	Supply Reduction.....	2-1
	Demand Reduction.....	2-2
2002.	Marine Corps Policy.....	2-3
2003.	Responsibilities.....	2-3
2004.	Host Nation Support.....	2-5
	PP&O Sponsorship.....	2-5
	CG MCCDC Responsibility.....	2-5
	Training Philosophy.....	2-5
	Supporting Roles.....	2-6

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT

3001.	Summary of Previous Support.....	3-1
	At the Source.....	3-1
	In Transit.....	3-2
	In the U.S.....	3-2
3002.	Current and Future Levels of Support.....	3-2
	USCINCSO.....	3-2
	JTF-4 and JTF-5.....	3-3
	JTF-6.....	3-3
	Marine Corps Direction in Host Nation Riverine Enhancements.....	3-3

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT PROCEDURES

4001.	Operational Support to USCINCSO.....	4-1
4002.	CD Security Assistance MTT Deployments.....	4-1
4003.	Operational Support to the JTFs.....	4-2
	Operational support to JTF-4 and JTF-5.....	4-2
	Operational Support to JTF-6.....	4-2

CHAPTER 5

DEMAND REDUCTION

5001.	Summary.....	5-1
	Previous Support.....	5-1
	Current and Future Levels of Support.....	5-1

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

5002.	Drug Program Descriptions.....	5-1
	Biochemical Testing.....	5-1
	Training.....	5-2
	Treatment.....	5-2
	Planning and Coordination.....	5-2
	Evaluation.....	5-3
	Counseling.....	5-3
	Community Drug Prevention.....	5-3
5003.	Goals for Demand Reduction.....	5-4
5004.	External Use by Outside Agencies.....	5-4

CHAPTER 6

FISCAL GUIDANCE

6001.	Responsibilities.....	6-1
6002.	Identification of CD Requirements.....	6-1
6003.	Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS).....	6-2
6004.	Marine Corps CD POM Procedures.....	6-2
6005.	Marine Corps CD Budget.....	6-3
6006.	Future OSD CD POM and Budget Requirements.....	6-4

CHAPTER 7

LEGAL GUIDANCE

7001.	Current Legislation.....	7-1
7002.	Current Funding Prohibitions.....	7-1

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd)

7003.	Current Legal Restrictions.....	7-1
	The Posse Comitatus Act.....	7-1
	"Military Purposes Doctrinel"	7-2
7004.	Liability.....	7-2

CHAPTER 8

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

8001.	Role of Public Affairs.....	8-1
8002.	Guidance for Commanders Conducting Operational Support.....	8-1
8003.	Guidance for Commanders Participating in Demand Reduction Efforts.....	8-1
8004.	Public Affairs Suggestions.....	8-2

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

INTRODUCTION

0001. Purpose. To establish a baseline for Marine Corps support of National level counterdrug supply and demand reduction efforts. To formalize the implementation of the current Marine Corps counterdrug policy and codify the responsibilities for implementation; and finally to provide a blueprint for future support.

0002. Background

1. Drug abuse and drug trafficking pose a threat of far greater magnitude to the United States than is commonly perceived. Not only do about one in ten of our citizens use some form of illicit drug, but to varying degrees, all Americans pay for the over \$150 billion that annually flows to the drug dealers and the additional \$60 to \$80 billion that is lost through absenteeism, inefficiency, embezzlement, no productivity and medical expenses.

2. National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS)

a. On the fifth of September 1989, President Bush announced the first National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) which was designed to galvanize the various Federal, State and local government agencies involved in curbing the flow and use of drugs in the United States, in order to attack all fronts of our drug problem with a common purpose and direction.

b. Three subsequent editions of the National Drug Control Strategy have been published, each building on the previous year's experience. One common thread is present through all editions of the NDCS; although more Americans are being convinced that illicit drugs are dangerous and that their use is not glamorous, far too many still engage in this destructive practice. This does not mean that the effort is a lost cause, only that the campaign will be long and fraught with both losses and victories. The outcome will be determined by the level of commitment sustained both by our leaders as well as our citizens.

¹ George Bush, National Drug Control Strategy, Washington: The White House, September 5, 1989, p. 2.

c. In September 1993, Dr. Lee P. Brown, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) announced the 1993 Interim NDCS. The Interim Strategy is intended to give a new direction and reinvigorate this nation's efforts. Key elements of the Interim Strategy include:

- * drug policy as a cornerstone of domestic policy;
- * targeting prevention programs, especially among inner-city youth;
- * targeting hard-core drug users;
- * reducing drug-related violence;
- * promoting certainty of punishment for all drug offenders;
- * designing anti-drug strategies based on knowledge gained from research; and
- * working with other nations that demonstrate the political will to end illegal drug trafficking.²

d. There is no quick solution to our national drug use and trafficking problems; it is estimated that it will take 10 years to reduce overall drug use by 55 percent and to reduce the estimated amounts of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and other dangerous drugs entering the United States by 60 percent.³

3. Agency Cooperation

a. There are at present 14 federal agencies directly involved in some aspect of drug law enforcement. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is the principal investigative agency and works closely with such other organizations as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in apprehending drug law offenders. Although these agencies are often frustrated by the tremendous volume of drug traffic and the inability of the legal system to handle the load, cooperation among local, state, and federal drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) is improving significantly.

² Lee P. Brown, Breaking The Cycle of Drug Abuse, 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy, Washington: September 1993, pp. 2-3.

³ George Bush, National Drug Control Strategy, Washington: The White House, January 25, 1990, pp. 118-120.

b. Problems occasionally develop when DLEAs operating in overlapping jurisdictions compete for federal dollars. These agencies often have differing perspectives that can inhibit cooperation and intelligence sharing, and thus hinder the overall effort to reduce the supply and demand of illicit drugs.

4. Role of the Department of Defense (DoD). If the drug trafficking and abuse problem has historically been within the purview of law enforcement and health and human service organizations, what is the role of the Department of Defense (DoD) and, in particular, of the Marine Corps?

a. Although DoD and the Armed Forces (including the Marine Corps) have for many years provided DLEAs with equipment and training, on 18 September 1989, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) initiated a deeper, more comprehensive military support role in counterdrug activities. This guidance supported the NDCS of attacking drugs (1) at the production source, (2) in transit, and (3) within the United States.

b. The Secretary also directed appropriate Unified and Specified Commands to prepare plans for detecting and countering the flow of narcotics into the United States. Three Joint Task Forces now exist (JTF-4 in Key West, Florida; JTF-5 in Alameda, California; and JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas) to coordinate military support to DLEAs in their areas of responsibility.

c. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO) provides resources, training, and intelligence and operational support through U.S. embassies to the host nations in his theater to combat drug production and trafficking; he also coordinates aerial and maritime detection and monitoring throughout his theater, and collects and provides drug-related intelligence through U.S. ambassadors to the host nations and to other U.S. agencies.⁴

5. Department of the Navy (DON) Guidance. Following the lead of SECDEF, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) issued guidance to the Department of the Navy (DON) on 16 November 1989. This guidance emphasized that DON was fully committed to supporting the NDCS and would, at all levels, seek to optimize its contribution to this "critically important mission. 115

⁴ U.S. Southern Command Counterdrug Campaign Plan (S), Quarry Heights, Panama: 13 November 1992, pp. 10-11.

⁵ H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary, Department of the Navy Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, Washington: 16 November 1989.

6. Marine Corps Policy. The Marine Corps commitment and policy for the implementation of DOD and DON guidance is contained in Marine Corps Bulletin 3000 dated 26 January 1993. This Bulletin⁶ is an updated version of the first policy statement published 14 February 1992. Additionally, in order to provide continuing guidance and direction for the counterdrug effort, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations (DC/S PP&O) was directed to establish a Headquarters Marine Corps Counterdrug Working Group (HQMC CDWG). The Working Group was formed during February 1993 to provide counterdrug policy recommendations, facilitate coordination, and develop a Marine Corps Counterdrug Campaign Plan.⁷

0003. Assumptions

1. The Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to serve as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States and will continue to support DLEAs and other Federal agencies.
2. The DoD effort to support aerial and maritime detection and monitoring (D&M) activities will decrease.
3. Increased emphasis will be placed on domestic demand reduction initiatives.
4. Counterdrug support will remain a non-traditional role.
5. Resources allocated for counterdrug support will decrease.
6. Increases in demand reduction funding will be at the expense of supply reduction and operational counterdrug support.
7. The Marine Corps counterdrug budget for supply reduction counterdrug support will experience zero growth in new procurement and research and development for counterdrug supply reduction efforts.

⁶ Message, CMC 261954ZJAN93, Marine Corps Bulletin 3000, Marine Corps Counterdrug (CD) Policy. ALMAR 040/93.

⁷ General W. E. Boomer, USMC, Assistant Commandant, Memorandum, Management of the Marine Corps Counterdrug Effort, Washington: 1 February 1993.

8. Counterdrug (CD) Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding to sustain Marine Corps CD operations tempo (OPTEMPO) will be reduced as part of a DoD-wide reduction in CD OPTEMPO, reducing the availability of the Active Component for CD support.

9. The Reserve Component and National Guard role in providing operational support will increase, allowing the diminishing Active Component to concentrate on other National Security priorities.

10. Funding to support Marine Corps Reserve activities will remain constant.

11. Current legal concerns will remain in force.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 1

THE NARCOTICS THREAT

1001. Foreign Supply

1. The Latin American Connection

a. Most of the illicit drugs which enter the United States come from Latin America and the Caribbean region. While Southeast Asia remains the principal source of heroin, Mexico and Colombia are challenging Asian suppliers. Mexican heroin is often sold in a form more potent and cheaper than the Southeast Asia variety. Colombian heroin is increasingly available in the United States. Colombian traffickers are improving opium processing and heroin production and are attempting to establish distribution outlets in the United States.

b. Globally, virtually all cocaine and most marijuana comes from Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, Peru produces 55 percent of the world's supply of coca leaf, while Bolivia produces 30 percent. Mexico produces over 70 percent of the marijuana crop each year. The United States is also a major producer and exporter of marijuana.

2. Trafficking Routes

a. Major Western Hemisphere air and sea narcotics trafficking routes historically have extended from Latin America, through the Caribbean, and into the Southern and Southeastern parts of the United States. Other busy routes are over Central America and Mexico to the Southwestern and Western states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Sea routes are constricted at the Yucatan Channel, and the Windward, Mona, and Anegada Passages.

b. Interdiction has been only marginally successful. While seizures have increased, and traffickers have been forced to adopt new (and presumably more expensive) smuggling methods, interdiction has not achieved the goal of deterring smugglers and reducing the flow of cocaine. Price, purity, and availability on American streets have remained relatively stable. Cocaine traffickers have remained largely immune to increased interdiction efforts by adopting new tactics. Instead of flying cocaine directly into the U.S., they fly the cocaine into Central America and Mexico--where U.S. law enforcement agencies lack jurisdiction--and then transport it by various means across the Southwest land border. Traffickers also transport cocaine in

shipping containers and in numerous, sometimes obscure hiding places aboard large vessels.⁸

3. Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Opiates from Southeast Asia enter the United States primarily in Hawaii, California, and Washington. Similar drugs from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran follow a different route through the Middle East and southern Turkey, then enter the Northeastern United States directly or through Europe or Canada. Much of the heroin from the Middle East is primarily destined for the European market.

4. National Security Problems. Trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs generate national security problems at home and abroad.

a. Considering the enormous sums of money involved and the sophistication of the larger trafficking operations, efforts by drug cartels to either buy the support of government officials or intimidate them can be expected. Such activities threaten the stability and continuity of democratically elected governments friendly to the United States and can subvert the loyalties of some U.S. political, judicial, law enforcement, and military personnel.

b. Insurgents and revolutionary groups such as the Sendero Luminoso (Peru) or the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) often rely on drug trafficking as a source of revenue. It is increasingly difficult to separate the insurgents from the narco-traffickers.

c. Private armies in Asia also traffic in drugs, and their operations often erode the effectiveness of central governments. In many cases, these trafficking organizations are "shadow governments" which wield more influence and power than the elected or recognized government.

5. Recognizing these threats, the President signed NSDD 221 declaring the international drug trade a threat to national security. Congress concurred and financed the efforts to combat this threat.

⁸ United States General Accounting Office, Testimony of Louis J. Rodriguez to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Increased Interdiction and Its Contribution to the War on Drugs, Washington: 25 February 1993.

1002. Domestic Demand

1. Our country's drug use rate is the highest of any of the world's industrialized countries. In 1991, 26 million Americans used illegal drugs, and 50% used them at least once a month. Most users also use alcohol and tobacco heavily.⁹ The National Academy of Sciences estimates that 5.5 million Americans have serious drug problems requiring treatment.¹⁰

2. Americans view drug abuse as a major cause of urban decline, family destruction, and reduced economic productivity all of which characterize U.S. society today.¹¹ They worry about protecting their children from drug use, addiction, and drug-related violence. The news is full of scenes of drug abuse: crack-addicted mothers; abandoned, drug-addicted babies; children caught up in drugs instead of in school; gang shootouts which kill innocent bystanders; and star athletes who overdose. Amidst these pervasive scenes, Americans wonder what--as individuals and as a nation--they can do to attack this problem.¹²

⁹ "National Household Survey on Drug Abuse" National Institute of Drug Abuse, 1991.

¹⁰ "Treating Drug Problems: A Study of the Evolution, Effectiveness, and Financing of Public and Private Drug Treatment Systems," Institute of Medicine, Washington, D.C., 1990.

¹¹ In 1989 a Gallup Poll found that 40% of Americans of all ages had personal dealings with drug abuse and dealing. "Surveys of the Attitudes of American Adults and Teenagers Toward the Drug Crisis and Drug Policy," The George H. Gallup International Foundation, August 4, 1989.

¹² The Making of a Drug-Free America, by Mathea Falco, Times Books, copyright 1992.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 2

POLICY

2001. Department of Defense (DoD). Current DOD policy is to support the Interim NDCS emphasizing the need for an integrated program which includes demand and supply reduction, dismantling drug cartels, and the interdiction of the transport of illicit drugs. 13

1. Supply Reduction

a. The Department supports Federal, State, and local LEAs in their efforts to disrupt the transport of illegal drugs into the United States, especially along critical border locations.

b. The Department's focus of supporting efforts in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru provides training and operational support to host nation (HN) police and military forces. These efforts are coordinated by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO).

c. The Department supports the DEA's Kingpin strategy to dismantle drug cartel leadership and the cocaine production and exportation business. This includes providing DOD linguistic and intelligence analyst support and expanding information gathering/sharing programs.

d. Aerial and maritime D&M of drugs in transit to the United States is coordinated and conducted by JTF-4 and JTF-5 [the drug Task Forces for the Commanders in Chief Atlantic (USCINCUSACOM) and Pacific (USCINCPAC) respectively]

e. Operational support to DLEAs to combat the flow of drugs into the United States along the Southwest border is coordinated by JTF-6 [the drug task force for the Commander, Forces Command (CDRFORSCOM)].

¹³ William J. Perry, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy, Washington: 27 October 1993.

f. Regional Logistics Support Offices (RLSO). The Department established the Regional Logistics Support Offices (RLSO) to assist in accomplishing the objectives of the NDCS.

(1) The four regional offices (Buffalo NY, El Paso TX, Miami FL, and Long Beach CA) are the focal points for DLEAs seeking non-operational logistics and training support. The RLSOs are responsible for screening and monitoring requests from local drug enforcement agencies and for forwarding support requests to the Services.

(2) The SECNAV has statutory authority through DODInst 5525.5 (DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), to approve requests for loans and leases of Marine Corps equipment and facilities to LEAs. SECNAV has delegated the statutory authority to act in his behalf for these loans and leases to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASN M&RA) through SECNAVINST 5820.7B (Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials).

2. Demand Reduction

a. Successful demand reduction efforts are critical to preventing further decay in American society. Some Americans view the military as a viable and, to date, virtually untapped resource in the arena of demand reduction. However, within the context of the National Military Strategy, any increased emphasis by the military on counterdrug demand reduction must not detract from DoD's primary mission of providing combat-ready military forces which can defend U.S. National Security interests.

b. Current DoD policy seeks to eliminate illicit drug use within the Armed Forces and among DOD civilian personnel.

(1) Drug abuse awareness and prevention programs for both active duty and Reserve Marines and their dependents are the primary way to deter illicit drug use. The DoD school system has an extensive program in this area for children of military personnel.

(2) DoD and all the Services make their experience and expertise in reducing demand for illegal drugs available to other organizations both within and outside the Federal government. For example, DoD has helped the Department of Justice with its responsibilities for incarceration and rehabilitation of drug criminals by training Federal, State, and local personnel in the conduct of rehabilitation-oriented training camps.

(3) Military Departments and the National Guard are implementing expanded community counterdrug outreach programs that target "at risk/inner-city" youth.

2002. Marine Corps Policy

1. The Marine Corps will continue to actively support the total DOD CD effort in both supply and demand reduction. Based on SECDEF's 18 Sep 89 Guidance, the Marine Corps CD effort will receive appropriate emphasis and priority commensurate with its high priority national security mission. Commanders must ensure that:

a. Counterdrug support to CINCs/JTFs is reflected in annual training and exercise plans.

b. Continuous and close coordination is maintained with the appropriate CINCs to support their CD effort to ensure that Marine Corps capabilities are correctly articulated in each CINC's CD plan.

c. Marines conducting CD training and operations in support of CINCs and DLEAs receive appropriate predeployment training on peacetime rules of engagement and human rights (if applicable).

d. Marines deploying outside the U. S. to conduct CD DFTs and MTTs are mature, possess requisite leadership and applicable MOS skills, and receive specific predeployment training to accomplish mission tasks. DFTs and MTTs must contain a sufficient number of appropriate language-trained Marines to accomplish DFT/MTT mission objectives.

e. The importance of Marine Corps contributions to the CD effort will be emphasized to all Marines. Each Marine will be encouraged to volunteer in local community programs. The Marine Corps must reinforce its commitment to reducing the demand for illicit drugs by setting a positive example for young people, both in the community and aboard military installations. The Marine Corps recruiting and advertising effort must also reflect this commitment.

2003. Responsibilities

1. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations (DC/S PP&O) is the HQMC coordinator for developing Marine Corps CD policy on both supply and demand reduction programs; provides membership to the Drug Demand Reduction Advisory Board (DDRAB) of

the DON Drug Demand Reduction Task Force (DDRTF); chairs the HQMC Counterdrug working Group (CDWG); sponsors supply reduction programs and initiatives; sponsors the counterdrug Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and budget development, management and execution. DC/S PP&O is the single point of contact for Marine Corps coordination with DON, OSD, the Joint Staff, and other agencies on all counterdrug matters.

2. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC/S M&RA) sponsors Marine Corps demand reduction programs and initiatives; provides membership to the DDRAB of the DON DDRTF; and is a member of the HQMC CDWG.

3. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics (DC/S I&L) coordinates all nonoperational support for organizations external to the Marine Corps, and is a member of the HQMC CDWG. Nonoperational support is defined as the provision of Marine Corps equipment to or use of Marine Corps facilities by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

4. The Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG MCCDC), develops training plans and programs supporting both supply and demand reduction efforts; is a member of the HQMC CDWG; and, utilizing the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS), identifies Marine Corps deficiencies to support supply and demand reduction programs. Additionally, CG MCCDC supports the design, development, and validation of approved demand reduction pilot efforts; however, support will be given only if the pilot efforts do not threaten or compete for Marine Corps appropriated training resources, i.e., training and education establishment resources identified in the POM process.

5. The Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) and the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC) provide operational CD support through their respective CINC; and provide personnel and/or training support to CD security assistance programs within their capability.

6. The Commanding General, Marine Reserve Force (CG MARRESFOR) provides operational CD support, which CMC requests and coordinates, and also provides personnel and/or training support to CD security assistance programs. CG MARRESFOR also executes demand reduction programs developed and coordinated by DC/S M&RA.

7. The Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command (COMMARCORSSYSCOM) provides acquisition management, personnel and/or training support to CD security assistance programs as requested by CMC, and within capability.

2004. Host Nation Support

1. PP&O Sponsorship. DC/S PP&O, through the Director of Operations, is the sponsor for all supply reduction initiatives. These initiatives are normally associated with security assistance training or foreign military sales (FMS) and will be guided by the Marine Corps security assistance policy contained in MCO 4900.3.

a. Operational support provided to the supported CINCs is coordinated directly by Marine component commanders with their CINCs.

b. New program initiatives to support host nation CD training or equipment acquisition will not be undertaken until a full assessment and policy decision is reached. DC/S PP&O, after consultation with CG MCCDC, COMMARCORSYSCOM, the appropriate Marine component commander, and subject matter experts, will provide a recommendation to CMC on whether the Marine Corps should sponsor a new program.

c. Factors in this decision include:

- * a valid request from the Ambassador;
- * CINC concurrence;
- * applicability to CINC CD and theater objectives;
- * applicability to the host nation CD effort;
- * capability of the Marine Corps to perform the mission; and
- * impact on Marine Corps operational and personnel tempo.

2. CG MCCDC Responsibility. CG MCCDC (CSW) is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, certifying, deploying, and sustaining CD MTTs. CG MCCDC also helps DC/S PP&O to assess future program initiatives during site surveys and liaison visits. Based on the responsibility for developing appropriate programs of instruction (P01) and lesson plans associated with deploying CD MTTs, CG MCCDC must provide recommendations during the early development of any Marine Corps policy on initiating a new host nation program.

3. Training Philosophy. The main effort for Marine Corps CD host nation training will be in the Drug Source Areas (DSA) of Colombia and Peru. Since the Marine Corps has had no previous inquiries regarding Bolivia, it is assumed that the Marine Corps will not participate in any security assistance training in that country. Venezuela, although not a DSA, does have a close relationship with the Marine Corps, is cooperating with the

Colombian armed forces along their common borders and rivers in CD activity, and therefore would be considered as a future candidate for training programs. Future training of the Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DAN) of the Colombian National Police (CNP) will be considered, when requested by the Ambassador. The Marine Corps will then conduct a full and careful review of the request to include the effectiveness of the DAN CD effort in Colombia, compliance with the CINC's theater strategy, the impact, if any, of training host nation police forces versus military forces, and the potential impact on Marine Corps personnel and operational tempo. Regardless of what programs the Marine Corps adopts, the goal is to train the trainers and help the countries attain a level of self-sufficiency, both in training and in logistics capability.

4. Supporting Roles. COMMARFORLANT, COMMARFORPAC, CG MARRESFOR, and COMMARCORSYSCOM will be requested to participate in site surveys to determine program adoption, if applicable, and to provide support, which CG MCCDC requests, to ensure program success.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT

3001. Summary of Previous Support

1. At the Source. Supporting USCINCSO's counterdrug (CD) effort requires the Marine Corps to provide the following:

- * riverine mobile training teams (MTTs) to improve host nation military forces' ability to conduct riverine operations against narcotraffickers;
- * riverine deployments for training (DFTS);
- * other MTTs which improve host nation military capabilities and reflect Marine Corps unique skills;
- * operational support such as ground based radar deployments to support regionally coordinated operations.

a. The Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Coalition and Special Warfare Division) (CG MCCDC (CSW)) organizes, trains, equips, certifies, deploys, and provides sustainment support for riverine MTTs and all other CD MTTs. Since 1989, the Marine Corps has conducted 13 MTTs, including four riverine MTTs. Only Colombia is currently involved in the riverine MTT program. The goal of the Colombian riverine program is to train 15 Riverine Combat Elements (RCEs) and establish them at eleven different strategic river locations throughout the country. CG MCCDC has also deployed Marines to conduct training in/for:

- * OV-10 maintenance,
- * small weapons,
- * repair and maintenance,
- * NCOS and drill instructors.

b. DFTs provide opportunities to conduct combined training with host nation military riverine forces in order to augment the Marine Corps capability. Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) has been designated as Commander, Marine Forces South (COMMARFORSO) for planning and conducts all riverine DFTs in support of USCINCSO's forward presence policy. Since 1989, COMMARFORLANT Marines have been involved in 23 DFTs.

c. To support USCINCSO's regionally coordinated CD operations, MARFORLANT and MARRESFOR have deployed ground-based radars with support personnel to Colombia. These deployments

have assisted USCINCSO's regional aerial detection and monitoring effort and measurably improved the Colombian Air Force's ability to react to drug trafficking aircraft flying from Peru to Colombia.

2. In Transit. From FY 90 and through FY 91, MARFORLANT and MARFORPAC flew over 4500 flight hours in support of JTF-4 and JTF-5 aerial and maritime detection and monitoring efforts. During 1989 and until Desert Shield/Desert Storm, MARFORLANT continuously deployed a VMO Detachment to NAS Roosevelt Roads, PR, in support of JTF-4. MARRESFOR assumed this commitment during Desert Storm and deployed a VMO Detachment to the Lesser Antilles for 60 days. During 1st Qtr FY 90, MARRESFOR also deployed a ground based radar with support personnel to the Bahamas for 90 days to provide aerial detection and monitoring support to JTF-4.

3. In the U.S. Since 1989, most of Marine Corps CD activity in the U.S. has been along the Southwest border to support JTF-6. Since that time, over 130 separate operational support missions have been conducted along the Southwest border and on the West Coast. Mission profiles include listening post/observation post (LP/OP) operations, aerial reconnaissance missions, and engineer support missions. MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT, and MARRESFOR have all provided operational support to JTF-6. However, MARFORPAC is the lead Marine Corps operational command for coordinating and conducting Marine Corps support to JTF-6.

3002. Current and Future Levels of Support

1. USCINCSO. The current tempo of operational support to USCINCSO is not anticipated to change appreciably.

a. MARFORLANT deploys, on the average, six DFTs per year. The number can increase or decrease marginally depending on a particular country's willingness to host the DFT. MARFORLANT normally provides 3 Marines to Naval Special Warfare Unit 8 (NSWU-8) riverine DFTs on a recurring basis. These DFTs average five per year.

b. MCCDC currently deploys one riverine MTT per year in support of the Colombian Marine Corps riverine program. The MTT consists of between 10-15 Marines. By Dec 93, the Marine Corps will have completed its initial commitment to deliver forty-five 22-foot Piranha riverine craft and train 15 Riverine Combat Elements (RCEs). Colombia would like to establish a total of 29 RCEs and purchase additional 22-foot craft and thirty-five 30-foot riverine assault craft (RACs). This will require an

additional acquisition and training investment by the Marine Corps through the next three years.

C. The frequency of MTTs will remain at about one per year. Requests for MTTs from Venezuela, Peru, or the Colombian National Police (CNP) for riverine and small unit tactics training may be forthcoming. Each request will be assessed on its merits, including: the degree to which it supports the CINC's theater strategy; USMC ability to support the request; and its impact on our continued support to the Colombian program.

d. The Marine Corps will not commit to further foreign military training initiatives if such initiatives impact on operational readiness or further exacerbate personnel and operational tempo.

2. JTF-4 and JTF-5. Currently, there is no operational support provided to either JTF-4 or JTF-5. The focus is aerial and maritime detection and monitoring. There has not been great demand for Marine Corps aviation or ground assets. With the deactivation of the VMO squadrons in the Active Component, there will be few requests for Marine Corps support. Future support could be provided by VMFA squadrons deployed aboard aircraft carriers as part of a JTF-4 or JTF-5 detection and monitoring naval task force/group.

3. JTF-6. The Marine Corps conducted 70 separate CD training missions in FY 92, and 71 in FY 93. The Marine Corps anticipates maintaining this operational level. The driving factor is operational and personnel tempo coupled with the Marine Corps force structure reductions. As the Active Component begins to experience faster operational and personnel tempo, MARRESFOR may be asked to provide additional support.

4. Marine Corps Direction in Host Nation Riverine Enhancements. The Marine Corps will complete its initial agreement to train 15 RCEs by the end of calendar year (CY) 93. Continued support for this program will depend on Colombia's purchase of the USMC version of the RAC, the continued acquisition by MARCORSYSCOM of 22-foot Piranha riverine craft, and the ability of MCCDC to provide qualified trainers. Other riverine initiatives will not be considered if they degrade the Marine Corps commitment to Colombia or adversely affect operational and personnel tempo.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT PROCEDURES

4001. Operational Support to USCINCSO. Operational support in this context is defined as DFTs and the provision of planning assistance teams and ground-based radar support. MARFORLANT, as MARFORSO (designated for planning), is the lead Marine Force for providing operational support to USCINCSO. If MARFORLANT cannot provide the requested support, MARRESFOR assistance will be requested. Close and continuous coordination with MARFORLANT is required. CD deployments in support of USCINCSO require SECDEF/Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) concurrence and will result in the publication of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) deployment order.

- * MARFORLANT will receive its authority to deploy from JCS through USCINCUSACOM.
- * MARRESFOR will receive its authority to deploy from JCS through CMC.

4002. CD Security Assistance MTT Deployments

1. Upon receiving a request from a U.S. Military Group (MILGRP), with concurrence of the CINC, for CD training in connection with a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, a Survey Team coordinated by CG MCCDC (CSW) and consisting of HQMC, MCCDC (CSW), and subject matter experts (SME) will be dispatched to assess and evaluate the following:

- * the training requirements;
- * how the training will support the CINC's theater strategy objective;
- * suitability for Marine Corps training;
- * the capability of the Marine Corps to support the training;
- * the long range benefit to the Marine Corps.

Upon completing this assessment, a recommendation will be made to CMC (PP&O) for a policy decision on supporting the requested training program. If approved, CG MCCDC (CSW) is tasked with organizing, training, equipping, certifying, deploying and providing sustainment support to the MTT. Upon request of CG MCCDC, CMC tasks MARFORLANT, MARFORPAC, MARRESFOR, and the supporting Establishment to provide personnel and other support.

2. For non-riverine MTTs, MCCDC will use the global-sourcing concept to capitalize on the availability of language and skill-qualified Marines throughout the operating forces and the Supporting Establishment. Because of the CD funding linkage between CD riverine DFTs and the personnel needed to conduct CD riverine training, most of the personnel support for CD riverine MTTs will come from MARFORLANT. Augmentation will only be requested if the required number of personnel are not available within MARFORLANT. CD MTT deployments are constrained by the same requirement for SECDEF/CJCS approval as is operational support for deployments outside the U.S. CG MCCDC receives its authority to deploy a CD MTT from JCS through CMC.

4003. Operational Support to the JTFs

1. Operational Support to JTF-4 and JTF-5. Support is coordinated and tasked through USCINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC to their Marine component commanders. MARRESFOR support feasibility can be requested by either Force Commander in the event that he cannot support his CINC. Formal requests for MARRESFOR support to JTF-4 and JTF-5 are sent to CMC (POS) from the respective CINC. CMC assesses the feasibility of MARRESFOR support and tasks accordingly. Operational support requiring deployment outside the borders of the U.S. requires SECDEF/CJCS approval and a JCS deployment order. Marine components would be authorized to deploy by JCS through their respective CINC; MARRESFOR would be authorized to deploy by JCS through CMC.

2. Operational Support to JTF-6. JTF-6 provides training opportunities to MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT, and MARRESFOR, and serves the dual purposes of supporting DLEA CD efforts and providing small unit commanders the ability to conduct small unit training in a different environment.

a. As a result of the command relationships between JTF-6, its parent commander FORSCOM, and MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT, and MARRESFOR, no formal tasking for support can be originated by FORSCOM to Marine Active or Reserve forces. JTF-6 annually provides a list of anticipated CD training missions which require military support. MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT, and MARRESFOR express interest in particular missions and are tentatively force-listed to that mission. JTF-6, through FORSCOM1 will request Marine Corps support from the appropriate CINC that has operational control of the Marine component. As long as the training mission does not conflict with a CINC requirement, the CINC will authorize his Marine component to participate. For MARRESFOR training missions, FORSCOM requests CMC authority to use MARRESFOR units in support of JTF-6. CMC tasks MARRESFOR to

provide the requested support if it is feasible and can be accomplished within the requested timeframe.

b. For missions not previously planned, JTF-6 and FORSCOM are authorized to conduct liaison with MARFORPAC, MARFORLANT, and MARRESFOR to determine availability before submitting a formal request through the appropriate CINC or to CMC (if applicable).

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 5

DEMAND REDUCTION

5001. Summary

1. Previous Support. The Marine Corps Substance Abuse Program has had strong prevention and treatment elements since its inception in 1980.¹⁴ The program is both active and reactive and applies to both Active Component and Reserve Marines. The objective of the program is to inform Marines as to: USMC policy on the use of illegal drugs; consequences for use, distribution, or possession; the urinalysis testing program; addiction and substance abuse training; indicators of substance abuse; administrative actions for substance abuse; and the Marine Corps Community Drug Education Assistance Program (MCCDEAP).

2. Current and Future Levels of Support. Internal programs will continue to focus on prevention, education, treatment and rehabilitation. The number of seminars given throughout the Marine Corps on substance abuse will continue at its already increased rate. Urinalysis testing will be expanded slightly as quotas are added at the Navy Drug Screening Labs (NDSL) in order to reduce field testing and increase testing of all Marines to an average of 3 times a year. Community programs will expand by providing funds to hire a civilian at selected Marine Corps bases and Reserve Centers, under the MCCDEAP program, to direct our efforts to work with dependent military children and children in the surrounding communities. The Marine Corps is also expanding its educational and community prevention programs to improve the preventive nature of the substance abuse program by lending support to the Young Marines of the Marine Corps League.

5002. Drug Program Descriptions

1. Biochemical Testing. A great deal of the Substance Abuse Program's success can be attributed to the Marine Corps' comprehensive urinalysis program. Precise adherence to testing procedures, high frequency of testing, and the element of surprise are hallmarks of the Marine Corps urinalysis program.

¹⁴ Evidence of the program's success is seen in the reduction of drug use among Marines from 37 percent in 1980 to 5.4 percent in 1992. (Figures represent self-reported use and are taken from the Worldwide Survey of Substance Abuse Among Military Personnel).

a. Approximately 500,000 urine samples are tested each year at regional Navy Drug Screening Laboratories (NDSL). Local testing programs enable the Marine Corps to address regional drug abuse trends. Approximately 170,000 local drug tests are conducted each year. Each Marine presently will be tested on average 2.5 times per year.

b. The urinalysis program is the best tool the Marine Corps has to identify abusers. It is a strong deterrent (66% of Marines say they don't abuse drugs because of the urinalysis). The positive rate, decreasing from 19.7% in 1980 to 0.76% in 1992, has continued to show the success of this program in reducing drug use in the Marine Corps.

2. Training. State-of-the-art substance abuse training and education programs enhance the Marine Corps prevention efforts. Each year over 1,500 Marines receive formal substance abuse training qualifying them to administer unit and command level treatment and prevention programs. Current training programs include the Navy Drug and Alcohol Counseling School, the Substance Abuse Information Course, and the Junior/Senior Substance Abuse Awareness Seminar. The Marine Corps will maintain its current training level of 30 substance abuse counselors per year.

3. Treatment. Each year, approximately 2,400 Marines participate in substance abuse treatment (Levels I, II and III combined). Marine Corps counselors specialize in treating resistant patients. The Marine Corps strongly adheres to the addictions model which enables the 82 substance abuse counselors to interact successfully with civilian treatment programs. The Marine Corps welcomes a free exchange of information, and shares innovative treatment ideas and modalities. While future treatment efforts will continue to remain essentially the same, a revision of the Marine Corps Substance Abuse Program directive will enhance the overall functioning of the treatment program by standardizing Level I and Level II programs throughout the Marine Corps. In addition, pre-care and post-care programs will be developed or formalized. These improvements should increase the treatment success record.

4. Planning and Coordination. The substance abuse program requires substantial planning and coordination. The Alcohol and Drugs Information Tracking System (ADMITS) is on-line for fundamental information gathering. Automation has increased the reporting capabilities of every command and has enabled HQMC to be more responsive to information needs.

5. Evaluation. Evaluation of 11people" programs, though difficult, is vital. The Marine Corps uses a program of clinical supervision, "The Preceptorship Program," to ensure consistent quality throughout the substance abuse programs. In addition, the Marine Corps participates in the Worldwide Survey of Substance Abuse and Health Behaviors Among Military Personnel. Plans are being made to assess the impact of substance abuse on the general health and well-being of Marines. This health risk assessment will help determine what health promotion activities reduce substance abuse-related health problems and accidents. HQMC and major command site visits and inspections ensure the proper and timely implementation of Substance Abuse Program directive revisions.

6. Counseling. Marine Corps counseling efforts employ 82 Marine Corps substance abuse counselors trained at the Navy Drug and Alcohol Counselors School. The school is intensive and 11 weeks in length. Counselor certification, which includes preceptor supervision and passing of a comprehensive test, requires an internship for one year. Counselors are required to obtain 15 continuing education units (CEU) each year to maintain certification. All volunteers are screened before selection. The Marine Corps doesn't employ any civilian contract counselors.

7. Community Drug Prevention. The Marine Corps has always had a strong positive presence in the civilian community. When this presence is assessed in terms of drug abuse prevention, it adds up to over 1,200 Marines reaching over 600,000 civilians each year.

a. MCO 5355.4 (Marine Corps Community Drug Education Assistance Program (MCCDEAP)), published in 1990, formalizes and expands this partnership between Marines and surrounding communities. The Order authorizes educational materials, films and various other materials to be made available to the community, along with the use of Marine Corps facilities and manpower.

b. This same level of support is also given to the Marine Corps pilot drug demand reduction program, the Young Marines (YM) of the Marine Corps League, on a not-to-interfere basis. The goal is to establish a YM unit at every base, emphasizing drug demand reduction in the local community.

c. The availability of these resources coupled with the increased emphasis on demand reduction in the Marine Corps training and educational programs will ensure an active, timely, and well targeted demand reduction program.

5003. Goals for Demand Reduction. The Marine Corps Substance Abuse Program goals at the major command level are to:

- * provide in-depth screening for alcohol dependency by school trained Marine counselors (MOS 8538);
- * arrange medical evaluation for any Marine suspected of alcohol dependency;
- * provide outpatient treatment for any Marine diagnosed as a non-dependent alcohol abuser;
- * provide post-care services for Marines successfully completing a drug and alcohol program;
- * assist Substance Abuse Control Officers (SACO'S) in providing preventive education to members of their command;
- * provide training to Substance Abuse Control Officers and to members of the local commands;
- * provide liaison between the command and local community alcohol treatment resources, including the local AA/NA.

5004. External Use by Outside Agencies. The Marine Corps drug demand reduction efforts, along those of other Federal agencies, are part of the entire National Strategy for demand reduction. Information is obtained and shared with the Department of the Navy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, The Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 6

FISCAL GUIDANCE

6001. Responsibilities

1. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC/S PP&O) is the sponsor for the Marine Corps' part of the Department of Defense CD Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and budget. Sponsorship is executed through the Director of Operations and includes the development, consolidation, and management of the POM and budget. The Director of Operations is also responsible for coordinating the identification of Marine Corps resource requirements to support CD operational support, prepares and reviews the applicable documents which support the Marine Corps CD POM and budget, and ensures that the documents are validated by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources (DC/S P&R) before submitting them to DON and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

2. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC/S M&RA) sponsors the Marine Corps demand-reduction program and is responsible for identifying demand reduction resource requirements and submitting the requirements to DC/S PP&O for inclusion in the POM and budget submissions. DC/S M&RA is also responsible for the proper management and execution of allocated demand reduction funding and provides periodic obligation status reports to DC/S PP&O for consolidation with supply reduction budget obligations for validation by P&R and further reporting to DON and OSD.

3. CG MCCDC (CSW) is responsible for data entry, report generation, and CD POM/budget analysis. This requires close and frequent coordination with the Operations Division within PP&O, and the P&R Department to ensure sound fiscal management, proper execution, and the validation of CD requirements. CG MCCDC (CSW) will make recommendations to DC/S PP&O for approval of new CD requirements to support Marine Corps operating forces; budget re-programming actions to ensure efficient execution of existing CD programs; and the distribution of allocated CD funds to MARFORLANT, MARFORPAC, MARRESFOR, MCCDC, and the Supporting Establishment.

6002. Identification of CD Requirements. The OSD Drug Coordinator submits the CD portion of the DOD POM and budget to SECDEF for approval before submission to Congress. The OSD POM and budget reflects the stated requirements necessary for the

CINCs, Services and Defense Agencies to provide CD operational support and to implement internal demand reduction programs. While some of the submitted requirements may be unique to supporting the CD effort, most of the requirements reflect either additional resources required to conduct CD operations over and above a CINC or Service's other mandated missions, or a percentage of a Service's operational requirement taken from its regular POM submission. Since the CD POM and budget are centrally managed at the OSD level, Services and Defense Agencies must annotate which portion of their overall funding allocations are devoted to CD support and then obligate only those funds identified in support of the CD effort.

6003. Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS)

1. MCO P3900.15 (Marine Corps Combat Development Process) establishes the process used by the Marine Corps to identify, obtain, and support necessary combat capabilities.
2. The CBRS is used to develop operational, functional, and tactical concepts that lead to the development of combat capabilities. CBNRS uses a planned approach that compares current doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, equipment, and facilities and support to national policy and strategy against projections of future threats and technological advances. CBRS consists of three components: concept development, deficiency identification, and requirements determination.
3. CG MCCDC is responsible to CMC for the implementation, execution, and the management of the CBRS.
4. The CBRS will be used to determine Marine Corps-unique CD requirements and Marine Corps warfighting requirements that have CD applicability. This effort will reduce redundancy and ensure that the Marine Corps CD POM supports the regular Marine Corps POM process.

6004. Marine Corps CD POM Procedures

1. Identifying Marine Corps requirements to support the CD effort requires the close coordination of DC/S PP&O, CG MCCDC, DC/S M&RA, DC/S P&R, COMMARCORSYSCOM, and the active and Reserve operating forces. Although the Marine Corps CD POM and budget submission parallels the normal POM and budget submission procedure, it does not always follow the same timeline. However, the two should be developed concurrently.

2. To ensure CD requirements are valid Marine Corps requirements and are not duplicated in the Marine Corps POM, the following procedures are followed:

a. DC/S PP&O issues CD POM guidance and requests identification of CD requirements based on the CBRS from CC MCCDC; and any new or out-of-cycle CD requirements from MARFORLANT, MARFORPAC, MARRESFOR, and MARCORSYSCOM.

b. Marine Corps CD requirements must support CINC CD Integrated Priority Lists (IPL). Marine component coordination with the appropriate CINC is required to ensure IPLs correctly reflect Marine Corps CD requirements.

c. MARRESFOR CD requirements are identified in much the same way as deficiencies are identified to receive funding from the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA). DC/S M&RA monitors potential CD deficiencies identified by MARRESFOR and coordinates with CC MCCDC to determine validity by the Combat Development Process. Valid requirements will be forwarded to DC/S PP&O for consolidation into the CD POM.

d. Requirements are submitted to DC/S PP&O for consolidation and validation. Validation is accomplished through the PP&O representative to the HQMC POM working Group. New requirements are validated for both warfighting and CD applicability. A determination is made as to whether the CD requirement is a new or existing Marine Corps POM requirement. If it is already a Marine Corps POM requirement, the dollar value of the CD requirement will be subtracted from the Marine Corps POM and placed only in the CD POM.

e. CC MCCDC (CSW) compiles the data on the validated requirements and produces the POM format for review by DC/S PP&O and DC/S P&R. Upon review completion, the POM is submitted to the Under Secretary of the Navy for review and consolidation with the Navy POM. This POM does not compete with the Navy POM for resources, nor is it limited to a specific percentage of the overall DON CD POM.

6005. Marine Corps CD Budget. The budget submission is based on the approved OSD CD POM. Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) are submitted by DC/S PP&O, with a copy to DC/S P&R, to request funding from Congress for specific programs. BES describe the specific CD programs, explain why such programs are required and how they support a CINC (if applicable), and detail what the impact on the Marine Corps will be if the requested funding is not approved. These detailed reports are gathered from data

contained in the POM and from updated information provided by the HQMC Staff, MARFORLANT, MARFORPAC, MARRESFOR, MCCDC, and MARCORSYSCOM.

6006. Future OSD CD POM and Budget Requirements. The Marine Corps submitted to OSD a variety of procurement programs to support the CD effort in POM 92. POM 94 updated and re-validated the previous requirements, but did not identify any new procurement requirements. As the OSD CD POM and budget programs are reduced to reflect a diminishing DOD supply reduction role, CD procurement funding will be difficult to justify and will receive very close scrutiny. Based upon the current and projected frequency and type of CD support, the Marine Corps should not have any emerging procurement requirements. CD Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps (O&MMC) funds, however, should remain relatively constant and sufficient to sustain the projected tempo of operational support.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 7

LEGAL GUIDANCE

7001. Current Legislation

1. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484) directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a pilot outreach program to reduce the demand for illegal drugs. The program is to include outreach activities by the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed forces and is to focus primarily on youth in general and inner-city youth in particular. The pilot program is to last for three years.
2. The Act authorized an increase in funding for demand reduction programs and included a provision that authorized the Secretary of Defense to obligate funds for a substantial increase and expansion in outreach demand reduction programs, including the payment of costs necessary to reach inner-city youth.
3. The Act also specifically prohibited the appropriation of funds for procuring or upgrading of a counterdrug detection and monitoring system, for research and development of any such system, or for the lease or rent of such a system until after the date on which the SECDEF submits a report to Congress that assesses the effectiveness of the pilot outreach program (not later than two years after the date of the Appropriation Act).

7002. Current Funding Prohibitions. There is a general prohibition regarding use of appropriated funds. Simply put, no funds can be used for purposes other than what was specifically authorized. Therefore, no funds other than those specifically authorized for counterdrug programs may be used for these purposes.

7003. Current Legal Restrictions

1. The Posse Comitatus Act. The primary statutory restriction on participation of military personnel in civilian law enforcement activities is the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385). The Act provides:

"[w]hoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be

fined not more than \$10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

Although not expressly applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps, the prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act have been extended to similarly restrict the use of personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps without proper approval by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Navy.

2. "Military Purposes Doctrine." Under the rubric of Posse Comitatus, there is a doctrine--sometimes referred to as the Military Purposes Doctrine--which states that actions taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States, regardless of incidental benefits to civilian authorities, do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act. For example, the Act does not preclude loaning military equipment, nor does it apply to the enforcement of laws outside the United States. Thus, despite the current restriction the Act places on using military personnel to enforce Federal or state drug laws inside the United States, it poses no obstacle to providing material or conducting drug supply-reduction operations outside the United States, since such operations are authorized and funded by Congress, approved by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy, and conducted as part of the foreign affairs of the United States. These exceptions notwithstanding, it is important that the Military Purposes Doctrine not be used as a subterfuge to avoid the clear restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act.

7004. Liability

1. A significant problem related to Marine Corps support of demand reduction programs is the potential liability resulting from injury to non-servicemember participants. Since some of these programs will involve non-servicemember participants in military oriented activities or on military facilities, there is a potential for injury to the participants and supervisors, with resulting claims of liability directed to the Marine Corps and/or supervisory personnel of the programs.

a. Civilian participants are only entitled to compensation for injuries caused by the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) 2671-2680. Reserve service members not on active duty (or in a paid drill) status and civilian supervisors who are injured would not be entitled to Government medical or health care. Any determination as to the Government's liability will be made during the claims adjudication process. It is possible that non-military

supervisors could be held personally liable for negligent or intentional acts they commit that result in injury to a program participant.

b. Individual purchases of medical or liability coverage might offer protection for participants in the program, but would probably discourage many who could not afford the premiums. The Marine Corps would be prohibited from picking up the premiums for the medical or liability coverage, or from providing treatment other than lifesaving care at Government facilities, since neither of these options are specifically authorized by appropriation or permitted by other statutory authority.

c. To inform participants of the potential risks involved in participating in the program and to offer some limited protection from liability to the supervisors and Marine Corps, liability waivers should be offered and signed by each participant before he or she engages in a program's activities.

COUNTERDRUG CAMPAIGN PLAN

CHAPTER 8

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

8001. Role of Public Affairs. As the struggle to match resources to requirements continues, the American public must understand USMC capabilities. The mission of Public Affairs is to communicate with a wide variety of audiences in order to gain and maintain public support. Using the talents of Marine Corps writers, the Marine Corps story regarding participation in counterdrug operations can be told throughout the Marine Corps via Marines magazine and our in-house news wire service, MCNEWS. Through positive exposure of operations and the program itself, our efforts will be noticed. The resulting publicity could help maintain a positive image for the Marine Corps and may aid in recruiting volunteers from within the Corps to provide support for the program. Caution should be exercised, however, in ensuring that Marines associated with CD operational support are not identified in unclassified literature.

8002. Guidance for Commanders Conducting Operational Support

1. Although operational security is of paramount importance in counterdrug operations, external release of stories to local media can also generate positive public opinion toward the Marine Corps. Commanders can make information available to Public Affairs by appointing a public affairs action officer. This officer will be a point of contact at the unit level for unclassified information and background information on operations, the counterdrug program itself, and general information such as weapons, tactics, equipment, etc.

2. Most of the American public has only a vague notion of how the Marine Corps trains and what the Marine Corps does. The story of our capabilities is not one we can tell only once; it must be told repeatedly in media to the widest possible audience. We must ensure the public has maximum access to day-to-day operations and special exercises, within the limits imposed by operational security.

8003. Guidance for Commanders Participating in Demand Reduction Efforts. By using the base newspaper, those involved with demand reduction can get the word out to Marines on Marine Corps installations. Stories on a commander's intent and actions taken against those who use drugs can provide an effective deterrent to drug use. Feature stories in base publications can highlight

programs focused on reducing the demand for drugs on base and in the surrounding community. Local media can also describe programs aimed at reducing the demand for drugs in the community, i.e., school visits, law enforcement briefs, etc., in feature stories. Public Affairs can augment this effort through the external release of any stories produced through their offices.

8004. Public Affairs Suggestions

1. Use of the Fleet Hometown News Program to highlight individual Marines and unit involvement in counterdrug support activities.
2. The production of Public Service Announcements, aimed at youth, which focus on Marine Corps involvement in counterdrug operations and Marine Corps policy regarding drug use/abuse/involvement.
3. Notification of installation Public Affairs offices, through electronic means, of individuals involved in counterdrug activities who are available for interviews with both installation and local reporters.